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EFFECT OF UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS ON THE
OFFSHORE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE PROGRAM
Steven Ferraro*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP) allows
taxpayers who are delinquent in the filing of Reports of Foreign Bank
and Financial Accounts (FBAR) and corresponding unreported taxable
income the opportunity to be compliant. An FBAR is a disclosure form
that requires taxpayers holding foreign accounts aggregating over
$10,000 to submit financial information to the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) annually. After joining the OVDP, taxpayers file eight years of
back tax returns and FBARs. By doing so, taxpayers become responsible
for paying the back tax liability, plus interest, and related accuracy
penalties.1 In consideration for voluntary compliance, the IRS alleviates
all generally asserted penalties surrounding delinquent FBARs (FBAR
Penalties), and replaces them with a single 27.5% penalty on the highest
aggregate amount in the foreign financial accounts over the past eight
years (Offshore Penalty).2 Additionally, the IRS agrees not to
recommend taxpayer disclosure to the Department of Justice for criminal
prosecution.3
The success of the OVDP is widely accepted. As of November 2012,
the IRS collected $5 billion through the current OVDP and its previous
iterations, funds which otherwise would evade taxation in the United
States.4 Additionally, by bringing over 34,500 taxpayers into compliance,
the IRS saves future taxable dollars from escaping collection.5 Most
significantly, the IRS collects valuable information on previously
undisclosed foreign accounts aiding international tax enforcement
efforts.6 In exchange for these benefits, the IRS merely replaces the
potentially high FBAR penalties for the generally lower 27.5% Offshore
Penalty. Without the OVDP, the IRS would likely not know which
delinquent accounts to charge the FBAR Penalties.

*
Associate, Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., (Admitted in New Jersey). The author appreciates the
valuable comments on earlier drafts of this Article provided by Professor Steven Dean.
1
IRS, Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program: Frequently Asked Questions and Answers,
http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-ProgramFrequently-Asked-Questions-and-Answers (last visited June 26, 2012) [hereinafter FAQ].
2
Id. at 7.
3
Id. at 3.
4
IRS NEWS RELEASE IR-2012-64 (JUNE 26, 2012).
5
Id.
6
FAQ, supra note 1, at 1.
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Initial critics of the OVDP pointed to its one size fits all approach
toward delinquent taxpayers.7 Under the OVDP’s guidelines, all
taxpayers are charged a 27.5% Offshore Penalty, regardless of how
willful or fraudulent they were in neglecting to file their FBAR. This is
unlike FBAR Penalties, which vary by the level of willfulness.
Incidentally, in certain situations where a taxpayer nonwillfully violates
the FBAR reporting requirement, that taxpayer would pay a lower
penalty if caught outside the OVDP than if she entered the OVDP, and
paid the 27.5% Offshore Penalty. Given the likelihood of escaping an
audit, the OVDP incentivized nonwillful taxpayers to avoid the program.
To alleviate this problem the IRS devised an opt out feature that
allows nonwillful taxpayers to enter the OVDP and come into
compliance without facing steep penalties. Rather than accepting the
27.5% Offshore Penalty, taxpayers face a full examination and are
subject to FBAR penalties. One factor in determining the size of the
FBAR penalty is the willfulness of the FBAR Reporting Requirement
violation. The penalty for a willful violation of the FBAR Reporting
Requirement is significantly more draconian than the penalty for a
nonwillful violation. Thus, the standard for determining whether a
violation is willful, the Civil Willfulness Standard, is a factor for a
taxpayer to consider when determining whether to voluntarily disclose,
because it determines both the expected liability of opting out and the
expected liability of the FBAR penalties if caught outside the OVDP.
Tax practitioners are beginning to reexamine the Civil Willfulness
Standard after the recent Fourth Circuit case United States v.
Williams.8 In Williams, the court broke away from its more lenient
interpretation of the Civil Willfulness Standard, and moved toward a
stricter liability standard.9 Although the court declined to offer a bright
line rule, it devoted almost all of its opinion to whether or not a taxpayer
checked “No” on Question 7 of Schedule B, Part III of the taxpayer’s
Form 1040 (Question 7a).10 Question 7a asks whether a taxpayer held a
foreign account, and guides the taxpayer to check the FBAR instructions.
Based on that evidence (nearly exclusively), the court found Mr.
Williams in willful violation through willful blindness.11
Williams may have significant impact on certain taxpayers in relation
to the OVDP. With the IRS potentially finding more delinquent
taxpayers willful, and thus subject to a higher FBAR Penalty, it becomes
more expensive to stay out of the OVDP. If taxpayers do enter the
OVDP, the opt out procedure may be less appealing. For a relatively
blameless taxpayer who, pre-Williams, would have likely been found
nonwillful, there is a possibility that the best decision for that taxpayer is
to enter the OVDP, and not opt out. These changes have two effects.
7

See Thomas Zehnle, Rethinking the Approach to Voluntary Disclosures, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Jan. 31, 2012 at 577, available at 2012 TNT 20-3.
8
United States v. Williams, 489 F. App’x 655 (4th Cir. 2012).
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
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First, as previously explained, it can dramatically affect a delinquent
taxpayer’s decisions to enter the OVDP. Second, these changes also
affect the equity of the OVDP by practically removing the opt out for
many taxpayers, thus reviving the one size fits all approach of initial
concern.
This paper proposes a new solution for the OVDP in the wake of
Williams. The IRS should keep the incentives provided for taxpayers to
enter the OVDP, but also provide for equitable justice. This article bases
its structure on a proposal by the National Taxpayer Advocate, Nina
Olson, and features an incorporated version of the opt out system, which
codifies three distinct penalty tracks for taxpayers. This solution
maintains administrative ease, encourages disclosure, and promotes
equity in treatment.
Part II will review the success of the OVDP. First, it will provide an
overview of the OVDP, including its history, and significant features.
Secondly, the Part will analyze what features gave the OVDP success.
Part III will analyze the changing civil willfulness standard. First, it will
analyze the status of the civil willfulness standard, and how it was
potentially changed by the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Williams. Second,
the Part will consider how the changing willfulness standard might affect
the OVDP. Finally, Part IV will detail the solution to amend the OVDP
in light of Williams.
II. SUCCESS OF THE OVDP
A. Overview of the OVDP
The need for the OVDP arose from a growing concern about
undisclosed wealth held by U.S. citizens in foreign countries. The Tax
Justice Network estimates that wealth to be between $21 trillion and $32
trillion, which equates to between $190 billion and $280 billion of lost
annual tax revenue.12 With the U.S. Federal Budget deficit approaching
$1.1 trillion for fiscal year 2012, the tax revenue currently escaping the
IRS would reduce the deficit by approximately 25%.13 Considering the
looming actions Congress may take to cut entitlements, and raise revenue
from compliant taxpayers, policymakers must address this concern.
In addition to the historic budget shortfall, income inequality is near
an all time high.14 Pressure is mounting to encourage the government to
stand up for low, and middle income taxpayers, who use foreign
undisclosed accounts less frequently, by cracking down on wealthy
individuals who continue to obtain unfair tax advantages by hiding
12
Revealed: global super-rich has at least $21 trillion hidden in secret tax havens, TAX
JUSTICE NETWORK (July 22, 2012), http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/The_Price_of_
Offshore_Revisited_Presser_120722.pdf.
13
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN UPDATE TO THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL
YEARS 2012 TO 2022 (2012).
14
LINDA LEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE US INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND MOBILITY:
TRENDS AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS, R42400 (2012).
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wealth overseas. Compelling disclosure of foreign held assets while
preserving administrative resources would aid our country’s fiscal health,
and begin to mend income inequality.15
Based on the dual concerns of raising revenue and protecting fairness,
the IRS formally established a special voluntary disclosure program in
2009 (Program), similar to the current OVDP.16 This new Program,
considered alongside the IRS’s pursuit of John Doe Summons on foreign
UBS clients,17 increased examinations of FBAR fillings, and is part of a
concentrated effort to solve the issue of undisclosed foreign wealth.18
The Program allowed the IRS to assess an Offshore Penalty of 20% after
receiving full disclosure from the delinquent taxpayer.19 The 20%
Offshore Penalty was often substantially lower than the FBAR Penalties
assessed by the IRS outside the Program. The Program was successful. It
accepted 18,000 applications and, as of January 2012, the IRS collected
$3.4 billion with 5% of its claims still pending.20
Because delinquent taxpayers showed interest in making further
disclosures,21 the IRS announced a follow up Program in 2011, the
Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative (OVDI).22 The most significant
difference from the previous Program was an increase in the Offshore
Penalty, from 20% to 25%.23 The OVDI was also successful as it brought
in an additional 12,000 submissions.24

15
Even Congress has noted the need for a formal program. In 2008, just months before the
establishment of the OVDP, Senator Baucus noted that "[I]t's clear from today's testimony that we
have an opportunity—indeed a duty—to find legislative solutions to pressure the IRS and better
enable them to collect on the nearly $345 billion annually of legally-owed but unpaid taxes.” Sen.
Max Baucus, Baucus Says Congress Has a ‘Duty’ to Ameliorate Offshore Tax Evasion, TAX NOTES
TODAY, July 25, 2008, available at 2008 TNT 144-29.
16
The IRS has had a long-standing practice of voluntary disclosure, but has never established a
formal policy, except for a brief period in 2003. See FAQ, supra note 1, at 3.
17
In August 2009, the IRS, the Swiss government, and UBS came to an agreement that sent
United States client data from almost all the sources sought in the John Doe summonses to the IRS.
The purpose of this agreement was to reveal identities of taxpayers with foreign accounts to the
United States government. On November 17, 2009, the IRS estimated that the agreement would
produce 4,450 foreign accounts subject to an IRS investigation. Between 2001 and 2008, only bank
accounts worth more than $989,000 were subject to disclosure. David D. Stewart, IRS Releases UBS
Agreement Criteria, Results of Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 18, 2009,
available at 125 Tax Notes 832.
18
Between 2004 and 2009, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration found
penalties from examinations of FBARs increased 388% to $20,500,000, and penalties collected
increased from $1,800,000 to $9,800,000. Increases in Examinations, Penalties Commensurate with
Rise in FBAR Reporting, TIGTA Says, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 29, 2010, available at 2010 TNT
227-4. Furthermore, the IRS increased staffing, doubling the overseas offices of the Criminal
Investigations in 2010. The IRS now has offices in Beijing, Hong Kong, and Panama. Amy S.
Elliott, IRS Increases Staffing For Next Round of Offshore Enforcement, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov.
15, 2010, available at 129 Tax Notes 775.
19
Steven T. Miller, Memorandum from Deputy Comm’r for Serv. and Enforcement, Opt Out
and Removal Guide for 2009 OVDP and 2011 OVDI (June 1, 2011), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/2011_ovdi_opt_out_and_removal_guide_and_memo_june_1_201
1.pdf at 18.
20
IRS News Release IR 2012-5 (Jan. 9, 2012) [hereinafter $4.4 billion]; IRS News Release IR
2010-122 (Dec. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Prepared Remarks].
21
IRS News Release IR 2011-14 (Feb. 8, 2011).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
IRS News Release IR 2011-94 (Sept. 15, 2011).
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In 2012, the IRS established the OVDP, which unlike the first two
editions would remain active indefinitely.25 The IRS cited the “continued
strong interest from taxpayers and tax practitioners” for continuing this
Program.26 The Offshore Penalty increased once again from 25% to
27.5%.27 As of June 2012, the Program brought an additional 1,500
voluntary disclosures.28 The combined efforts of the three Programs
surpassed $5 billion in penalties, and back taxes. 29
To participate in the OVDP 30 the delinquent taxpayer must disclose
all of her foreign held assets which aggregate over $10,000 and were not
previously reported on FBARs.31 Additionally, taxpayers must file all
delinquent FBARs for the previous eight years,32 and complete an
“Offshore Letter,” which requires procedural information regarding the
taxpayer’s foreign account.33 For any account with an aggregate value
above $500,000 the taxpayer must provide bank statements to
substantiate the financial information.34
In addition to disclosure, taxpayers must also pay and calculate all
past due tax liability on income earned, and not reported from the
undisclosed accounts.35 Thus, taxpayers must submit their original U.S.
tax returns, along with their new amended U.S. tax returns, for all years
covered by the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure.36 The taxpayer must pay
all applicable interest, and a 20% accuracy related penalty.37
In return for agreeing to voluntarily disclose accounts, and pay back
taxes and interest, the IRS allows the delinquent taxpayer to pay an
25

$4.4 billion, supra note 20.
Id.
27
FAQ, supra note 1, at 7.
28
IRS News Release IR 2012-64 (June 26, 2012).
29
Id.
30
The taxpayer’s process: to ensure that the taxpayer is eligible for the OVDP, the taxpayer
may submit her name, social security number, and other vital information to the IRS for preclearance. The goal of pre-clearance is to ensure that only eligible taxpayers send information to the
IRS. Upon passage from the pre-clearance department, the taxpayer must send an offshore letter to
the criminal investigations department. The criminal division will issue a preliminary acceptance to
the OVDP. Within ninety days of acceptance, the taxpayer must furnish the remaining required
information for a civil examination, including past due tax liabilities. There is no thorough
examination in this process. The civil examiner will ensure the completeness and correctness of the
submission, and accompanying paperwork, but will not follow an audit-like procedure. The IRS will
issue a Form 906 “Closing Agreement” which outlines the proposed Offshore Penalty. If the
taxpayer wishes to pay, she signs the closing agreement, and sends in the final Offshore Payment.
See FAQ, supra note 1, at 7.
31
The OVDP is specifically for taxpayers who have unreported tax liability income. The
OVDP is not for those who forgot to report assets that did not produce income. Additionally, the
OVDP is specifically for those people currently not under investigation by the IRS. See FAQ, supra
note 1, at 17.
32
Id. at 7. For calendar year taxpayers the voluntary disclosure period is the most recent eight
tax years for which the due date has already passed. The eight-year period does not include current
years for which there has not yet been noncompliance. The IRS is allowed to look back for eight
years if the taxpayer signs the relevant forms (the regular statute of limitations is only three years).
To facilitate the extended inquiry, the IRS requires signed forms to enter the OVDP.
33
Some of the information requested includes the estimated amount in each account, estimated
income from the accounts, financial institution, and contact information of the financial institution.
34
Id. at 25.
35
Id. at 7.
36
Id.
37
26 U.S.C. § 6662(a).
26
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Offshore Penalty in lieu of all FBAR Penalties. For many taxpayers the
Offshore Penalty is much less than the FBAR Penalties; for others,
however, it is not. The IRS lacks any authority to alter the Offshore
Penalty.38 Furthermore, there is no appeals process after completion of
the OVDP.39
B. Why the OVDP Worked
The OVDP has been extremely successful. To understand, or
criticize, the effect of the OVDP, the four goals of the Program must be
considered: raising revenue, bringing individual disclosing taxpayers into
compliance, assisting in further prosecutions, and reducing
administrative costs.
The first goal of the OVDP is to raise revenue. As indicated, the
budget deficit and U.S. government debt is growing unsustainably large
and may cause fiscal problems that threaten the United States in the not
so distant future. Given the staggering amount of wealth remaining
abroad, the IRS may combat the deficit by raising revenue through this
program. In this light, the collection of $5.5 billion, which otherwise
would still be abroad, is a great success. On the other hand, $5.5 billion
is only a fraction of potential tax revenue that could be collected from the
approximate $32 trillion held abroad by U.S. citizens.40 The Program has
failed to bring in a majority of foreign undisclosed wealth. However,
without this program, $5.5 billion would remain abroad.
The second goal of the OVDP is to bring individual taxpayers who
disclose permanently into compliance.41 The IRS accomplishes this goal
by requiring taxpayers in the Program to disclose account information by
filing delinquent FBARs and an Offshore Letter. The benefit to the IRS,
as explained by former IRS Commissioner Doug Schulman (Schulman),
is that these taxpayers will now “properly report and pay their taxes for
years to come.”42 The OVDP encourages all taxpayers to “come in
through the front door,” and hopefully continue to be compliant and pay
taxes in the future.43 The IRS seems to have accomplished this goal, as
38,000 taxpayers have entered compliance. However, others might
disagree, as that reflects only a small handful of delinquent taxpayers.
Nevertheless, because of this Program 38,000 taxpayers are now
compliant.
The third goal of the OVDP is to assist in further prosecutions. Each
voluntary disclosure submission contains information on the foreign
38

FAQ, supra note 1, at 50.
Id. at 49.
40
David Leigh, Leaks reveal secrets of the rich who hide cash offshore, THE GUARDIAN (Apr.
3, 2013) http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/apr/03/offshore-secrets-offshore-tax-haven.
41
The IRS describes the OVDP’s primary goal as “to bring taxpayers that have used
undisclosed foreign accounts, and undisclosed foreign entities to avoid or evade tax into compliance
with United States tax laws.” Id. at 2.
42
Prepared Remarks, supra note 20.
43
Marie Sapirie, Consistency is Focus of OVDI, Official Says, TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 21,
2011, available at 2011 TNT 54-4.
39
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account and financial institution. The IRS has been mining existing
information to identify the actors and institutions assisting U.S. taxpayers
in hiding offshore accounts. The IRS plans to use this information to
prosecute delinquent taxpayers in accordance with their power to issue
John Doe Summons, and it relies on the threat of further summonses to
encourage other taxpayers to disclose. In furtherance of this goal,
Schulman said, “With both preparers and the IRS stepping up their
efforts in the area, a ‘hide-in-the-sand’ approach to reporting offshore
accounts and income has become a much riskier calculus for US
taxpayers holding assets anywhere around the world.”44 This goal is the
most difficult to assess. Disclosure has decreased each year, an indication
that this Program may be losing momentum. It is possible that delinquent
taxpayers who value compliance with U.S. tax law have already
disclosed. The threat of foreign tax enforcement is growing, however, as
are the number of prosecutions. It may be best to revisit this goal after
the IRS has had the chance to develop their use of the information.
The final goal of the OVDP is to keep administrative costs low. The
IRS chose to take a one size fits all approach, greatly reducing the
amount of administrative resources needed for each disclosure. The
OVDP enables the IRS to centralize the criminal and civil processing of
voluntary disclosures and to resolve a large number of the cases without
formal (and costly) examination.45 This goal has been a success.
Underlying each of the four main policy goals is the OVDP’s ability
to incentivize taxpayers to voluntarily disclose. If it fails to bring in
taxpayers, the IRS would not achieve any of its goals. Therefore, before
discussing any changes to the OVDP, it is important to understand why
taxpayers would want to enter the OVDP. The five factors taxpayers
consider whether to enter the OVDP are: potential of being caught
outside the OVDP, penalty framework inside the OVDP, personal utility
placed on compliance with the U.S. tax law, certainty of timing and
amount of taxation; and criminal FBAR avoidance.
The first factor influencing the taxpayer’s decision is the greater risk
of being caught violating the FBAR Reporting Requirement outside the
OVDP. During the last four years, the IRS has engaged in a variety of
enforcement programs to find delinquent taxpayers hiding offshore
accounts. These programs include tax treaties, whistleblower laws, and
the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).46 Nondisclosing
taxpayers are now much less confident that their identity will remain
unknown to the IRS. Although the IRS is still less likely to catch
taxpayers outside the OVDP, the tide is changing and taxpayers have
more incentive than ever before to enter into compliance.
The role of audits is very important in evaluating this factor.
Although the overall audit rate is about 3% for individual taxpayers, that
44
Shulman Discusses Progress on IRS’s International Tax Agenda, Multiyear Tax Compliance
Strategy, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 10, 2009, available at 2009 TNT 236-15.
45
FAQ, supra note 1, at 1.
46
Id. at 4.
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does not paint the appropriate picture. The percentage of audits in which
the IRS agent found an error was approximately 30% among individuals.
Therefore, taxpayers should not feel comforted by the 3% audit figure.
The second factor encouraging taxpayers to enter the OVDP is the
special penalty framework. Taxpayers place varying degrees of
importance on this factor depending on the size and amount of their
accounts, and whether they violated the FBAR Reporting Requirement
“willfully” or “nonwillfully.” A taxpayer who violates the FBAR
Reporting Requirement willfully will likely face a lower overall penalty
by entering the OVDP as opposed to opting out. However, for taxpayers
who violate the FBAR Reporting Requirement nonwillfully, the offshore
penalty is less beneficial than being caught outside the OVDP. For those
taxpayers, the opt out is essentially neutralized, as they will pay the same
penalty being caught outside of the OVDP as by entering it and opting
out.
Third, potentially the most significant factor for some taxpayers is the
utility they derive from being compliant with the U.S. tax laws.47 When
analyzing a taxpayer’s decision to enter the OVDP, it would be easy to
consider only quantitative factors. However, some taxpayers who
discover that they have been violating the FBAR Reporting Requirement
may want to enter the OVDP to be compliant. This may be true even if
“quantitatively” they would be better off not entering the OVDP. Many
honest taxpayers likely find a high level of utility by following the law.
However, taxpayers who intentionally violate the FBAR Reporting
Requirements likely find less utility in compliance with tax law than
other taxpayers.
The fourth factor is the value taxpayers place on the certainty the
OVDP provides. The OVDP allows taxpayers to obtain certainty in two
areas: the timing of the penalty, and the amount of the penalty. The
certainty of the amount of the penalty is important because it allows
taxpayers to plan for the loss they will face. Taxpayers who live and rely
on the undisclosed money will be more sensitive to this factor. The
certainty of timing factor is important because it allows taxpayers to
prepare to make their payments. Taxpayers who opt out do not get either
benefit. As one tax practitioner asks, "What is the cost of being able to
sleep at night?" 48
The concept of risk aversion explains this factor. Risk aversion is the
behavioral economic concept whereby, given two equal levels of
expected tax liabilities, the taxpayer would prefer the option with the
least amount of variability. This happens because taxpayers value
certainty. Economic literature has indicated that people are more risk
averse when the losses are potentially high. Alternatively, people tend to
favor risk more when it involves a potentially high gain. Therefore, as
47
Utility is a concept in economics that encompasses an individual’s preferences. For example,
someone who enjoys baseball would likely derive a high level of utility from watching a no-hitter.
This would be more powerful with a citation.
48
Lee Sheppard, New Analysis: How Do United States Holders of Swiss Accounts Come
Clean?, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 25, 2008, available at 2008 TNT 188-5.
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the IRS pursues more aggressive enforcement policies that have the
effect of increasing the expected tax liability facing delinquent taxpayers,
the taxpayer becomes more risk averse and, therefore, more likely to
enter the OVDP because it provides certainty.
Finally, an additional incentive the OVDP offers is avoidance of
criminal charges. Taxpayers who acted willfully in their violation of the
FBAR Reporting Requirement, may be subject to criminal penalties.49
Entering the OVDP will shield this delinquent taxpayer, as the IRS will
not recommend the taxpayer to the criminal division. However, if a
taxpayer opts out, the IRS may pursue criminal prosecution.50 Taxpayers
who are not in danger of criminal prosecution will not consider this a
significant factor.
Even if the OVDP meets all of its goals, the IRS should not view it as
a success unless it treats all taxpayers equitably.51 Initially, a major
problem with the OVDP was that it treated all taxpayers the same,
regardless of the reason they failed to disclose their foreign accounts. For
example, some practitioners complained that there existed a major
difference between those taxpayers who inherited accounts from their
parents and never withdrew money to the United States, and those
taxpayers that deliberately set up foreign accounts to dodge domestic
taxation.52 To address the issue of equity, the IRS added programs that
lowered the Offshore Penalty to 5% or 12.5%, based on certain taxpayer
qualifications. 53 However, those programs only deal with a limited
number of taxpayers and do not address the problem at large.
The most important provision addressing equity concerns is the opt
out. This provision allows taxpayers to enter the OVDP instead of taking
the 27.5% Offshore Penalty and face an examination and argue that they
acted nonwillfully. Taxpayers will only use the opt out provision if they
would face a lower expected penalty under an examination than through
the Offshore Penalty. Thus, taxpayers who violated the FBAR
requirement willfully can pay the 27.5% Offshore Penalty, but those who
acted without willful intent can opt out, and pay the smaller FBAR
penalties.
The penalty framework is just one factor that influences taxpayers.
Taxpayers also consider the expected probability of the IRS catching
them outside the Program. In addition, many taxpayers who are
nonwillful value compliance with the U.S. law. Finally, some taxpayers
49

E.g., 26 U.S.C. 7201 (2013) (tax evasion); 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (2013) (filing a false return);
26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2013) (failure to file an income tax return); 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (2013) (willfully
failing to file an FBAR); 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (2013) (willfully filling a false FBAR). Note that when
the case is clearly nonwillful, there is no chance for a criminal violation. Thus, in those situations,
this factor is not as important.
50
FAQ, supra note 1, at 51.
51
It is important to note that this paper does not consider the horizontal equity between
taxpayers who violate different law. If the IRS pursues an OVDP for offshore evaders, is it equitable
to not give a similar program to those who are evading domestic corporate tax who want to enter
compliance? It seems that if this program is successful, others might follow in its steps.
52
Randall Jackson, Audit Might Be Best Choice For United States Taxpayers in Voluntary
Disclosure Program, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 8, 2010, available at 2010 TNT 68-1.
53
FAQ, supra note 1, at 53.
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prefer the certainty of knowing when they will have to make the
payment. Thus, even though some taxpayers may not be better off
quantitatively, other taxpayers will find it advantageous to enter the
OVDP, and then opt out.
Consider an example of two fictional taxpayers’ and their decision to
enter the OVDP. Ms. Francis Bar (Ms. Bar) inherited four foreign
accounts from wealthy overseas relatives, and used them for storing
money in Europe to pay for travel expenses; the monies never left the
foreign country and she does not live off the funds. The accounts earn
very little income, as Ms. Bar held them in basic low interest and low
risk savings accounts. She pays all foreign tax in a tax heavy jurisdiction.
When she speaks to her domestic accountant annually, Ms. Bar does not
disclose these accounts (nor does she report them or the corresponding
foreign tax credits), as she is not aware that foreign accounts are relevant
for U.S. income tax. Ms. Bar signed her Form 1040 and checked, “No”
on Question 7a. Based on this information, if examined, there is a 5%
chance that the IRS will find that she violated the FBAR regulation
willfully.
Mr. William Full (Mr. Full) opened four foreign accounts to deposit
money from his purely domestic self-owned business. He does not have
family in the foreign jurisdiction, or any other reason to visit. Mr. Full
works on a monthly basis with his accountant, but never mentions the
foreign money. Mr. Full tells his lawyers that he deposits his money
internationally because he believes in the diversification of asset
location. He lives predominantly off the foreign earnings and moves
most of the income back to the United States. Mr. Full signed his Form
1040 and checked “No” on Question 7a. Based on this information, and
given that the IRS agent would be viewing only circumstantial evidence,
there is a 50% chance that the IRS will find that he violated the FBAR
regulation willfully, if the IRS examines him.
Each taxpayer, Ms. Bar and Mr. Full, has an aggregate account
balance of $12,445,000, spread over four offshore accounts ($35,000;
$80,000; $330,000; and $12,000,000 respectively). The 27.5% Offshore
Penalty for both Ms. Bar and Mr. Full would be $3,422,375.54
When Mr. Full considers whether to enter the OVDP, he must know
his expected penalty if examined outside of the OVDP. If the IRS finds
Mr. Full to have willfully violated the FBAR Reporting Requirement, his
FBAR Penalty would be $37,068,000.55 However, if the IRS finds him to
have violated the FBAR Reporting Requirement nonwillfully, his penalty
would be $171,000.56 Given that Mr. Full would be found willful 50% of

54

$12,445,000 (aggregate account balance) × 0.275 (offshore penalty percentage) = $3,422,375
(offshore penalty).
55
$37,068,000 (willful penalty) = $5,000 (first account) + $8,000 (second account) + $165,000
(third account) + $6,000,000 (fourth account) × 6 (for each year).
56
$171,000 (nonwillful penalty) = $3,500 (first account) + $5,000 (second account) + $10,000
(third account) + $10,000 (fourth account) × 6 (for each year).
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the time, his expected penalty if examined outside of the OVDP would
be $18,619,500.57
Mr. Full will consider a variety of factors to determine whether or not
he should enter the OVDP. First, he will consider his chances of the IRS
catching him outside the OVDP. Mr. Full may look at whether the IRS is
scrutinizing banks from the foreign jurisdiction and whether the foreign
jurisdiction is entering into new tax agreements with the United States.
Second, Mr. Full will find that entering the OVDP provides a very
beneficial penalty framework. If he enters, he will save $15,197,175 as
opposed to not entering the Program and being caught by the IRS. Third,
Mr. Full will have to consider how much he values being compliant with
tax law. Fourth, Mr. Full will have to consider how much he values the
certainty of knowing how much he will pay and when he will pay it.
Given that he lives off the money, this may be important for him. Finally,
Mr. Full will have to decide whether he may be subject to criminal
penalties. Since the IRS may find that he violated the FBAR Reporting
Requirement willfully, this is a potential concern. Overall, this is a
complex decision for Mr. Full, and it will depend on how heavily he
weighs each factor. See Table 1 for a graphical summary of Mr. Full’s
decision.
Ms. Bar will also have a difficult decision to make. If the IRS finds
Ms. Bar to have acted willfully, her FBAR penalties will be
$37,068,000.58 However, if the IRS finds her to have acted nonwillfully,
her penalty will just be $171,500.59 Given that the IRS would find her to
be willful a projected 5% of the time, her expected penalty if examined
outside of the OVDP is $2,015,850.60 However, her expected penalty
outside the OVDP is lower than the Offshore Penalty. If she does enter,
she would likely opt out, and pay an expected $2,015,850.
Like Mr. Full, Ms. Bar will consider a variety of factors in deciding
whether or not to disclose. First, like Mr. Full, she will consider the
possibility of the IRS auditing her and specifically look at the IRS’s
international efforts in the foreign jurisdiction where her accounts are
located. Second, Ms. Bar will not consider entering the OVDP a benefit
in terms of the penalty framework, as she pays the same amount whether
she enters (and opts out) or the IRS catches her outside the OVDP. Third,
there is a good chance that Ms. Bar will want to enter the OVDP because
of the utility of being compliant; as she always acted without an intent to
violate the law, she will want to avoid being labeled a “tax cheat.”
Fourth, certainty is not likely to be important for her, because she does
not live off the money. Finally, since it is unlikely that she acted
willfully, criminal prosecution will not be a concern. Depending on how
57
$18,619,500 (expected penalty) = willful (0.50 × $37,068,000.00) + nonwillful (0.50 ×
$171,000.00).
58
$37,068,000 (Willful Penalty) = ($5,000 (first account) + $8,000 (second account) +
$165,000 (third account) + $6,000,000 (fourth account)) × 6 (for each year).
59
$171,000 (nonwillful penalty) = ($3,500 (first account) + $5,000 (second account) + $10,000
(third account) + $10,000 (fourth account)) × 6 (for each year).
60
$2,015,8000 (expected penalty) = willful (0.05 × $37,068,000) + nonwillful (0.95 ×
$171,000).
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heavily she weighs each of these factors, she will make her decision. No
one can predict what decision either Mr. Full or Ms. Bar would make;
however, by understanding what each taxpayer is considering, we can
see how a change in the OVDP would affect their decisions. See Table 1
for a graphical summary of Ms. Bar’s decision.
Table 1. Initial Decision Matrix for Ms. Bar and Mr. Full
Avoid the OVDP and
Enter the OVDP
Risk Audit
Expected Penalty
Expected Penalty of
Ms. Bar
of $2,015,850 (after
$2,015,850 if Examined;
(5% Willful;
opt out); Enter
Potential to Avoid Penalty
80% Nonwillful)
Compliance
If No Audit
Guaranteed Penalty
of $3,442,375; Enter
Expected Penalty of
Mr. Full
Compliance; Avoid
$18,619,500 if Examined;
(50% Willful;
Criminal Prosecution; Potential to Avoid Penalty
50% Nonwillful)
Certainty of Penalty
If No Audit
Liability
Based on these two taxpayers, the goals of the OVDP are met. The
utility of being compliant attracts a taxpayer like Ms. Bar to the OVDP.
Likewise, the OVDP is attractive to Mr. Bar because it offers a lower
expected tax liability, removal possible criminal penalties, and the
certainty of the payment amount and timing. The decision for both
taxpayers is not clear; it depends on how each taxpayer weighs the
factors. However, the OVDPs wide range of incentives will likely
convince many taxpayers to enter their overseas wealth.
In terms of equity, the OVDP does an acceptable job. A taxpayer like
Mr. Full pays a reduced penalty compared to what he would have faced
if caught outside the OVDP. That penalty, however, is still higher than
for a taxpayer like Ms. Bar who will opt out and pay a lower FBAR
Penalty.
III. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AFTER WILLIAMS
A. The Changing Civil Willfulness Standard
The decision whether or not to enter the OVDP depends on whether
the expected FBAR Penalty faced outside of the OVDP is higher or
lower than the Offshore Penalty faced inside.61 Thus, measurement of the
61
Under the authority of 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (2013), enacted through the Bank Secrecy Act, the
IRS requires taxpayers having a financial interest in or signature authority over one or more financial
accounts held internationally, valued at a collective minimum of $10,000, to file an annual FBAR. In
order to enforce the FBAR requirement, the IRS was given the power to assess civil penalties for
failure to file. 31 C.F.R. § 103.56 (2013). The FBAR must be filed before June 30 of the calendar
year after the account was recorded. Any person in the U.S., as a resident or a citizen, is subject to
these reporting rules, and must file an FBAR. This is not limited to individuals; corporations, limited
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FBAR penalty levies a great impact on the success of the OVDP. To
determine the expected FBAR penalty for a specific taxpayer, the IRS
considers three factors: the size of the account, the number of accounts,
and the level of willfulness in committing the violation.62 The first two
factors are rather straightforward, and cause little controversy.63 The final
factor, level of willfulness, presents the most debate.
The IRS and various U.S. courts have been drawing a picture of what
they consider a willful violation. On July 20, 2012, however, the civil
willfulness standard underwent a potentially dramatic change after the
Fourth Circuit Court handed down United States v. Williams, which was
the first U.S. circuit court case ruling on the standard.64 In this
nonbinding opinion, the Appellate Court took a staunch position.
Recently, a U.S. District Court in Utah followed a similar legal strategy
as Williams.65
A review of the civil willfulness standard is necessary before
examining how it potentially changed after Williams. The IRS considers
three distinct levels of conduct: negligence, nonwillful, and willful. The
negligence penalty applies only to businesses, and thus, is not a focus of
this paper.66 Regarding the latter two categories of conduct, the IRS
levies a lower FBAR penalty on taxpayers who violate the FBAR
requirement nonwillfully than those who did so willfully.67 A nonwillful
violator faces a maximum penalty of $10,000 per account per year.68 The
IRS offers the possibility of mitigation to reduce penalties based on

liability corporations, and partnerships must also comply. Bank accounts and financial securities
must be reported, as well as other financial accounts, such as shares of insurance proceeds, mutual
funds, and annuities with a cash value. The IRS says that an FBAR must be filed for “tangible assets
such as real estate or art; and intangible assets such as patents or stock or other interests in a U.S. or
foreign business.” FAQ, supra note 1, at 35. Any account held in a foreign bank is a foreign account,
and must be reported. A bank is considered foreign for this purpose if the funds are actually kept in a
foreign country, regardless of where the bank’s headquarters are located. Thus, if funds are kept in a
bank in foreign county, which has headquarters in the U.S., the bank is considered foreign. The
penalty for an FBAR violation can be significant. It is important to first note that the IRS does not
have to impose any penalties on a violation; rather, the IRS can issue a warning letter. The IRS will
make that decision when “the facts and circumstances” do not justify a penalty. See Id. at 5. In these
cases, a FBAR warning letter (I.R.M. § 4.26.17) is issued.
62
I.R.M. § 4.26.14.4 (2008).
63
This may be an understatement for the variable related to the number of individual accounts.
A taxpayer who fails to file FBARs related to ten individual accounts, each worth $1,000,000, is
liable for penalties commensurate to $1,000,000. However, a taxpayer who fails to file an FBAR for
an individual account of $10,000,000 is liable for penalties commensurate to $100,000. The
distinction is made to reflect the fact that an FBAR must be filed for each account, and thus the first
taxpayer actually incurred ten separate violations, whereas the second taxpayer incurred only one.
However, in this case, the IRS fails to adhere to principles of horizontal equity. There is a need to
address this concern.
64
Williams, supra note 8.
65
See United States v. McBride, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (D. Utah 2012).
66
I.R.M. § 4.26.16.4.3 (2008).
67
It is important to note that the IRS will generally pursue mitigation when possible. The
purpose of the FBAR penalties is not to enforce punitive damages but to ensure compliance.
Therefore, if IRS agents feel that a warning letter will, “promote compliance,” and, “achieve the
desired result of improving compliance in the future,” the IRS Manual instructs agents to only offer
the letter. I.R.M. § 4.26.16.4.7 (2008).
68
I.R.M., supra note 62, at 4.26.14.4.
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account size.69 See Table 2 for a graphical explanation of the nonwillful
penalty mitigation.
Table 2. Nonwillful Penalties Per Taxpayer Per Year
Penalty Level
Penalty Guideline
Penalty
If the aggregate balance
$500 for each
for all accounts in violation
violation, not to
Level 1
does not exceed $50,000, a
exceed $5,000 for all
Level 1 penalty applies.
violations.
If a Level 1 penalty does
$5,000 for each
not apply, and if the balance
Level 2 violation, not
of an account to which the
Level 2
to exceed 10% of the
violations relate does not
balance in each Level
exceed $250,000, a Level 2
2 accounts.
penalty applies.
If a Level 1 penalty does
not apply, and if the balance
of an account to which the
$10,000 for each
Level 3
violations relate exceeds
Level 3 violation.
$250,000, a Level 3 penalty
applies.
The penalty for a willful violation is harsher. The IRS can hold any
taxpayer liable for at least $100,000 per account per year, or 50% of the
value of each account per year.70 Once again, the IRS offers a penalty
mitigation guideline. See Table 3 below for a graphical view.

69
Mitigation is not available in all circumstances. The IRS agents are generally encouraged to
offer mitigation to both willful and nonwillful violators when four conditions are met: (1) the
taxpayer has no history of past FBAR penalty assessments, (2) no money passing through the foreign
accounts in question is associated with an illegal source or used to further a criminal purpose, (3) the
taxpayer cooperated through the FBAR investigation, and (4) the IRS did not pursue a claim for civil
fraud for any year in question. I.R.M. § 4.26.16.4.5.6 (2008).
70
I.R.M. § 4.26.16.4.5 (2008).
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Table 3. Willful Penalties Per Taxpayer Per Year
Penalty Level
Penalty Guideline
Penalty
If the aggregate balance
A minimum of
for all accounts to which the
$1,000 per violation or
Level 1
violations relate did not
5% of the balance of
exceed $50,000, a Level 1
each account.
penalty applies.
If a Level 1 penalty does
A minimum of
not apply, and if the balance
$5,000 per Level 2
an account to which the
Level 2
violation or 10% of the
violations relate does not
balance for each Level
exceed $250,000, a Level 2
2 account.
penalty applies.
A minimum of 10%
If the balance of an
of the balance of each
account to which the
Level 3 account or
violations relate exceeds
50% of the closing
Level 3
$250,000, but is less than
balance of each Level
$1,000,000, a Level 3
3 account as of the last
penalty applies.
day for filing the
FBAR.
A minimum of
If the balance of an
$100,000 per Level 4
account to which the
violation or 50% of the
Level 4
violations relate exceeds
closing balance of each
$1,000,000, the Level 4
Level 4 account as of
penalty applies.
the last day for filing
the FBAR.
Consider how the IRS would have calculated Mr. Full’s and Ms.
Bar’s expected FBAR penalties. If either taxpayer nonwillingly violated
the FBAR reporting requirement each would face an FBAR penalty of
$29,500 per year for six years.71 However, if either taxpayer was willful,
each would face an FBAR penalty of $6,272,500 each year for six
years.72 For Ms. Bar, there is an expected penalty of $2,015,850
($1,853,400 from the 5% of being willful, and an expected $162,450
from the 95% of being nonwillful).73 For Mr. Full, there is an expected
penalty of $18,619,500 ($18,534,000 from the 50% chance of being
willful and an expected $85,500 from the 50% chance of being

71
The two smaller accounts would be level two violations, and the taxpayers will be liable for
$9,500 ($5,000 + $4,500). The two larger accounts would be level three violations, totaling $20,000
($10,000 each).
72
The two smallest amounts will be considered Level 2 violations, totaling $10,000 of liability
($5,000 each). The next two higher accounts would be Level 3, and 4 violations, totaling liability of
$6,262,500 ($162,500 + $6,100,000).
73
See I.R.M., supra note 61, at 4.26.14.4.
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nonwillful).74 Even though both taxpayers have identical accounts, their
expected FBAR penalties would vary significantly depending on their
level of willfulness.
Given the significant difference between a willful penalty and a
nonwillful penalty, it is vital for taxpayers to clearly understand the
distinction between “willful” and “non-willful.” Remarkably, prior to
July 20, 2012, no case in a federal appellate court had defined civil
willfulness in an FBAR case.75 Instead, the IRS instructed taxpayers to
rely on the criminal definition of willfulness when dealing with civil
FBAR matters.76 The IRS argued that the adoption of the criminal
definition was appropriate because both statutes use the word “willful” in
similar contexts.77 See United States v. Sturman.78
The premier case interpreting willfulness is Cheek v. United States.79
In Cheek, an individual, after attending a series tax seminars, withheld
taxes because he believed that the income tax system was
unconstitutional.80 Mr. Cheek claimed that his genuine belief that taxes
are unconstitutional indicated that he did not behave “willfully.”81 The
Court defined willfulness as a “voluntary, intentional violation of a
known legal duty.”82 The definition requires proof that (1) the law
imposed a duty on the defendant, (2) the taxpayer knew of the duty, and
(3) the taxpayer voluntarily and intentionally violated the duty.83
Therefore, the Court found that Mr. Cheek acted willfully because he
was aware of the duty to pay taxes and intentionally violated that duty;
his belief that a duty is unconstitutional does not overturn the knowledge
of it.84
The Supreme Court further refined its interpretation of willfulness in
Ratzlaf v. United States85 whereby the Court considered the concept of
willfulness in a provision of the Bank Secrecy Act.86 Although Ratzlaf
74

See United States v. McBride, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (D. Utah 2012).
IRS Chief. Couns. Mem. 200603026 (Sept. 1, 2005).
“Both section 5321(a)(5), providing for a civil penalty, and section 5322(a), providing for
criminal penalties, contain similar ‘willfulness’ requirements…. The same word, willful, is used in
both of these sections. Statutory construction rules suggest that the same word used in related
sections have the same definition.” Id.
77
Id.
78
The definitive case that applies here, and defines the criminal willfulness standard in an
FBAR concept is United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466 (6th Cir. 1991). The taxpayers formed
over 150 companies, five of which were located in a foreign country. Id. In addition to evidence of
deceit, the taxpayer admitted to being aware of the Schedule B requirement. Id. The court cited
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) in that the willfulness standard was a, “voluntary,
intentional violation of a known legal duty.” Id. The corporations were created to conceal income,
and therefore, the taxpayer did not report the corporations on his FBAR. Id. The Court found that
“evidence of acts to conceal income and financial information” along with the taxpayers’ failure to
pursue the reporting requirements as Schedule B suggests. Id.
79
498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991).
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
The case would have been different if Mr. Cheek’s failure to file was a result of the
complexity of the law. Id.
85
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
86
This is the same act as the FBAR.
75
76
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admitted to willfully committing a physical act that violated the Bank
Secrecy Act, he denied that his actions were “willful,” because he did not
know that the physical action would violate the law.87 The Court agreed
with his argument, and found that to convict “willfully,” the taxpayer had
to violate a known law with the intent to violate that law.88 Thus, the
term willful, “consistently has been read by the Courts of Appeals to
require both knowledge of the reporting requirement and a specific intent
to commit the crime.”89 Additionally, the Court determined that
circumstantial evidence may be enough.90
Courts have also relied on the concept of “recklessness.” In Safeco
Insurance Co. of America v. Burr91 the Court held, regarding
recklessness, that, “where willfulness is a statutory condition of civil
liability, it is generally taken to cover not only violations of a standard
made knowingly, but also recklessly.”92 It determined that “willfully”
was a, “word of many meanings whose construction is often dependent
on the context of which it appears.”93 Therefore, the difference between
willful, wanton and reckless is meaningless.94 The case culminated with
the following: “at some point…a repeated failure to comply with known
regulations can move a defendant’s conduct from inadvertence neglect
into reckless or deliberate disregard, and thus willfulness.”95
The IRS has also equated willful blindness with willfulness. The IRS
manual explains that, “willfulness may be attributed to a person who has
made a conscious effort to avoid learning about the FBAR reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.96 The IRS has provided an example of
willful blindness to the FBAR requirement: “A taxpayer admits
knowledge of and fails to answer a question concerning signature
authority at foreign banks in Schedule B of his income tax returns. A
failure to follow up by looking at the FBAR instructions to see if you
have to file would provide some evidence of willful blindness.”97
The IRS argues that signing a return constitutes willful evasion if the
taxpayer fails to file a required FBAR. There are two bases for this
argument. First, if the taxpayer reviewed the required instructions as part
of question 7a, she had knowledge of the requirement and, thus, the
87

Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 141.
Id.
Id.
90
In United States v. Bilbrey, 142 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 1998) the court determined that signing a
Form 1040 was not enough for a willful conviction, but additional circumstantial evidence may be.
The taxpayer did not report all of her income on her tax returns, but did sign them. The court focused
not only on the signature but on the fact that the taxpayer played an active role in the business, and
had knowledge of the undisclosed income and revenue. There was additional evidence that she
should have known that her tax returns did not report all the income, as she was living off the
undisclosed income.
91
America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007).
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Am. Arms Int'l v. Herbert, 563 F.3d 78, 85 (4th Cir. 2009). The IRS manual does not
endorse this method. Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
88
89
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failure was willful. Second, if the taxpayer did not review the
instructions required as part of question 7a, the taxpayer actively chose
not to become aware of the law and was therefore willfully blind. Thus,
as long as the taxpayer signed her return, she was (or should have been)
aware of the FBAR requirement and the violation was willful. Before
July 20, 2012, courts rejected this as prima facie evidence.98
In Lurding v. United States,99 the court found that although signing a
return makes the document, “his own,” it does not give rise to enough
knowledge, without other circumstances, to claim that the taxpayer
willfully violated. Also, in United States v. Mohney,100 the court said,
“willfulness requires proof of specific intent to do something that the law
forbids; more than a showing of careless disregard for the trusty is
required.”101 Therefore, according to Mohney, a taxpayer’s signature on a
return does not in itself prove his knowledge, but knowledge can be
inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances. Examples of such
facts and circumstances are knowledge of business revenues, active role
in operations, hiring of an accounting firm and payment of taxes.102
On July 20, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
released the first judicial opinion outside of the U.S. Tax Court which
specifically adjudicated the civil willfulness standard in an FBAR
context.103 Prior to this decision, tax practitioners could not rely any
upper level court for guidance as to the definition of willfulness in an
FBAR context. In United States v. Williams, Mr. Williams opened two
bank accounts located in Switzerland, which contained over $7,000,000
in principal and created over $800,000 in income through 2000. During
that time, Mr. Williams failed to report both the income earned from this
account (as required in 26 USC § 61) and the presence of this account on
his FBAR (as required in 26 USC § 5314). Form 1040, question 7a
asked: “At any time during 2000, did you have an interest in or a
signature or other authority over a financial account in a foreign country,
such as a bank account, securities account, or other financial account?
See instructions for exceptions and filing requirements for Form TD F
90-22.1.”104
Mr. Williams checked “No” for this answer, and did not review the
instructions or send in an FBAR. After the IRS became aware of Mr.
Williams’ violations, it began a criminal investigation into his actions.105
Mr. Williams pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the IRS and criminal
tax evasion. He admitted to knowing about the obligation to file an
FBAR since 1993.106 The IRS subsequently assessed a civil penalty of
98
See United States v. Bilbrey, 142 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Sturman, 951
F.2d 1466, 1474 (6th Cir. 1991).
99
Lurding v. United States, 179 F.2d 419 (6th Cir. 1950).
100
United States v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 1397 (6th Cir. 1991).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
United States v. Williams, 489 F. App’x 655 (2012).
104
I.R.M., supra note 62, at 4.26.16.1.
105
Williams, 489 F. App’x at 657 n.2.
106
Id.
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$200,000 against Mr. Williams for failure to file his 2000 FBAR.107 The
district court ruled that the IRS failed to establish that Mr. Williams
willfully violated the law. The IRS appealed that decision to the Fourth
Circuit.108
On appeal, both parties agreed that a violation occurred; the question
before the court was whether the violation occurred willfully. The court
began its analysis with a reminder that Mr. Williams signed his 2000 tax
return under a penalty of perjury, and that, “a taxpayer who signs a tax
return will not be heard to claim innocence for not having actually read
the return, as he or she is charged with constructive knowledge of its
contents.”109 The court concluded that because Mr. Williams signed his
return he knew the contents of his return, specifically line 7a.110
Mr. Williams, however, claimed to have never read line 7a, or the
instructions for the FBAR.111 The court held that Mr. Williams engaged
in a, “conscious effort to avoid learning about reporting requirements,”
or willful blindness.112 Additionally, the court viewed his admission in
the criminal case that he was aware of the requirement as further
evidence of his willful behavior. The court, therefore, overruled the
district court and found Mr. Williams guilty for willfully failing to file an
FBAR.113
Although decided by the Fourth Circuit Court, the case was
unpublished, and thus, not binding on any subsequent court.114 This gives
other courts the latitude to make their own decisions, and potentially
diverge from the Williams case. Practitioners, however, must now
consider the possibility that other courts will follow Williams and view
checking “No” on question 7a as an important factor.
Substantively, the Williams case pursued a different method for
viewing the civil willfulness standard than the lower courts.115 The court
considered the fact that Mr. Williams signed his Form 1040 and said
“No” for question 7a, the main factor in finding him liable, and only
minimally discussed the circumstantial evidence against him. This
contrasts with the previous approach taken by lower courts to analyze the
facts before rendering a decision on willfulness. Practitioners must now
be more careful when advising clients. There is now a possibility that
courts will be more likely to find willfulness in the case of a box checked
“No.” While the Fourth Circuit stopped short of declaring a strict liability

107

Id.
Id.
109
Williams, 489 F. App’x. at 659 (citing Greer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 595
F.3d 338, 347 n.4 (2010)).
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Not only is Williams significant because it used a different method of viewing the issue, but
also because it took place at a higher court.
108
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standard, many observers feel such a standard will virtually be applied
going forward.116
The Williams ruling will make the IRS more likely to find taxpayers
willful, given many taxpayers check “No” on question 7a and do not file
an FBAR. This increased liability affects nearly half of taxpayers. In a
study conducted in July 2010, attorneys were questioned about question
7a.117 The survey estimated that out of those cases that enter the OVDP,
slightly less than half of the returns checked “No.”118 Most often, tax
practitioners noted, the error was caused either by return preparation
software or a simple oversight.119 In spite of the reason for checking
“No,” the new Williams standard turns the odds against taxpayers in a
willfulness determination.
B. Why a Changing Willfulness Standard Affects the OVDP
The potential effect of this stringent civil willfulness standard on
those who checked “No” will be significant to the OVDP in two ways.
First, Williams may make it more beneficial for a taxpayer to join the
OVDP because under Williams the expected tax liability of avoiding the
OVDP is increased. Second, if the expected FBAR penalty outside the
Program increases, it will make entry to the OVDP, and taking the 27.5%
offshore penalty, more attractive.
Consider how this change would affect Mr. Full and Ms. Bar. For Ms.
Bar, we estimated that there was an initial probability of 5% that the IRS
would find her willful. However, if we factor in the potential of
Williams, it is reasonable to estimate that the probability the IRS will
find the taxpayer willful may rise to 20%. Thus, we can predict that her
expected FBAR penalty outside of the OVDP will be $7,550,400, an
increase of about 275%.120 Mr. Full will see a relatively lower impact
based on Williams. Initially, he had a projected 50% chance of being
found willful. Considering Williams, we can be more confident that the
IRS will find willfulness and estimate his probability at 75%. Thus, his
expected FBAR penalty outside the OVDP is $27,843,750, 121 an increase
of almost 50%.
Williams will also change the estimated payment for entering the
OVDP. Although taxpayers may still opt out of the OVDP and accept the
normal FBAR penalty, Williams increases the expected FBAR penalty
obtained through opting out. After Williams, it is likely that the expected
116
Jeremiah Coder, FBAR Penalty Case Reversal Raises Questions About Civil Willfulness
Standard, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 24, 2012, available at 2012 TNT 142-2.
117
Daniel L. Gottfried, Proving Willfulness in FBARS – Checking ‘No’ Ain’t Apropos, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Sept. 2010, available at 2010 TNT 188-14.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
$7,550,400 (expected penalty) = willful (0.20 × $37,068,000) + nonwillful (0.80 ×
$171,000).
121
$27,843,750 (expected penalty) = willful (0.75 × $37,068,000) + nonwillful (0.25 ×
$171,000).
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liability of the FBAR penalty will be higher than the offshore penalty,
thus making the opt out less beneficial. The taxpayer who would have
previously opted out may find that accepting the offshore penalty is the
best option. This makes the OVDP more appealing, as the offshore
penalty provides a more beneficial framework.
Consider how these changes affect our two taxpayers’ decision to
enter OVDP. If Ms. Bar avoids the OVDP, her expected liability rises to
$7,550,400, and she is therefore more likely to enter. By entering the
OVDP, she will have to pay the offshore penalty of $3,422,375, as opting
out is not optimal. However, she will now have a lower penalty by
entering the OVDP than if the IRS caught her outside the OVDP. In
comparison, Ms. Bar previously would have paid the same penalty inside
the OVDP (by opting out) as she would outside. Her decision matrix is
reduced to whether paying $3,422,374, plus being compliant and
knowing liability (rather than being subject to an audit), is better than the
possibility of never getting caught (which would cost $7,550,400).
Although we cannot be sure what she will do, she has more incentive to
enter the OVDP.
If Mr. Full stays outside the OVDP, he will have an expected FBAR
penalty of $27,843,750. However, by entering the OVDP, he will only
pay the offshore penalty of $3,422,375. Thus, after Williams, Mr. Full
will pay $24,471,375 less by entering the OVDP than if caught by the
IRS. By comparison, without the Williams decision, Mr. Full would have
had to pay $18,619,500 if caught by the IRS and only $3,422,375 if he
entered the OVDP. Like Ms. Bar, his decision matrix is reduced to
whether paying $3,422,375, plus being compliant and knowing liability
(rather than being subject to an audit), is better than the possibility of
never getting caught (which would cost $27,843,750). He is clearly more
incentivized to enter the OVDP.
Table 4. Decision Matrix After Williams for Ms. Bar and Mr. Full
Avoid the OVDP and
Enter the OVDP
Risk Audit
Expected Penalty of
Ms. Bar
Guaranteed Penalty of
$7,550,400 if Examined;
(20% Willful;
$3,422,375; Enter
Potential to Avoid
80% Nonwillful)
Compliance
Penalty If No Audit
Guaranteed Penalty of
$3,442,375; Enter
Expected Penalty of
Mr. Full
Compliance; Avoid
$27,843,750 if Examined;
(70% Willful;
Criminal Prosecution;
Potential to Avoid
30% Nonwillful)
Certainty of Penalty
Penalty If No Audit
Liability
From an efficiency perspective, the Williams case will make Mr. Full
and taxpayers like him more inclined to enter into the OVDP. If Mr. Full
was previously on the fence about entering the OVDP, the Williams case
may motivate him to enter. It is unclear whether the Williams case will
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make Ms. Bar and taxpayers like her more inclined to enter the OVDP.
For the taxpayer like Ms. Bar, the cost of entering the OVDP has
significantly increased. With the opt out potentially not as important, she
will likely face the offshore penalty if she enters the OVDP. However,
the cost of staying outside the OVDP has also increased dramatically. In
Ms. Bar’s situation, it makes slightly more sense quantitatively for her to
enter the OVDP. However, Ms. Bar may now be more willing to sit out
and hope that the IRS will not audit her, considering the penalty levels
are higher.
Nina Olson, the National Taxpayer Advocate, addressed this problem
by writing that, “[i]ncreasing the danger that taxpayers who have
reasonably and in good faith tried to comply will nonetheless be
penalized may achieve an opposite result: that the IRS or the tax rules
will be perceived as unfair, and voluntary compliance will suffer.”122
From an equity perspective, the OVDP becomes more flawed after
Williams. Before the Williams case, the IRS treated Mr. Full and Ms. Bar
differently, reflecting the clear difference in their levels of willfulness,
despite having the same amount in accounts overseas. If Mr. Full entered
the OVDP, he would pay the 27.5% offshore penalty of $3,442,375,
whereas if Ms. Bar entered the OVDP she would opt out and have an
expected payment of only $2,180,225. Ms. Bar would have paid
$1,200,000 less. After Williams, however, either taxpayer would be
better off paying the 27.5% offshore penalty of $3,442,375 under the
OVDP.
Although Williams will make some taxpayers (those for whom the opt
out is not optimal) more likely to enter, it causes equity problems for
those who would have benefitted from the opt out under a gentler
willfulness standard. It is unjust to treat Mr. Full and Ms. Bar in the same
manner by asking each to pay the same 27.5% penalty. Equity was not a
concern pre-Williams because of the opt out procedure. However,
policymakers need a new solution if the current opt out option will not
provide equitable solutions to taxpayers like Ms. Bar.
IV. SUGGESTED NEW APPROACH TO THE OVDP
The future success of the OVDP is in question because of the equity
problems created by Williams. Policymakers must devise a solution to
address that problem, but also to preserve the success the IRS has had
encouraging taxpayers to disclose foreign taxes while keeping
administrative costs low. Policymakers must create a solution that holds
taxpayers liable for different penalties based on culpability.
An excellent starting point for a potential solution is a program
described by Nina Olson, the National Taxpayer Advocate. In a July
2012 report, prior to Williams, Ms. Olson proposed a tri-level OVDP to
further promote equity. Given that Williams only exacerbated any
previous equity problem, this solution is more relevant today than ever
122
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before. Under Ms. Olson’s program the IRS must establish “broad but
clearly defined categories for these taxpayers, based on the level of
noncompliance.”123 The three suggested categories are:
1. Full Relief from FBAR and Information Reporting Penalties
a. Taxpayers who have properly reported taxable income
but did not file FBARs; and
b. Taxpayers who did not properly report all taxable
income, but the tax liability is below a threshold amount.
2. Taxpayers Who Have Reasonable Cause and Acted Nonwillfully
a. Nonresident United States taxpayers who do not qualify
for category 1 because they did not file tax returns and owe
more in tax than the threshold amount; and
b. Violators that the IRS cannot prove acted willfully.
3. Taxpayers Not Included in Category 1 or 2
a. All other taxpayers124
Under the first prong of Ms. Olson’s Program there are two
circumstances which allow the disclosing taxpayer to have full relief
from FBAR penalties. First, taxpayers who have been properly reporting
income, but did not file an FBAR are immune from penalties.125 Second,
taxpayers whose taxable liability falls under a threshold amount will also
not be penalized. There is no de minimus provision in the current OVDP.
The second prong enforces a nonwillful FBAR penalty for taxpayers
whom the IRS cannot prove acted willfully. Finally, the IRS will reserve
the third prong for taxpayers who do not fall into the previous two
categories, presumably willful violators who will be required to pay the
offshore penalty.
The strength of Ms. Olson’s program is that it forces taxpayers to opt
out and choose a category. This will once again restore equity, as the IRS
treats individual taxpayers differently. This is more beneficial than the
current OVDP, because presently, when a taxpayer opts out and cannot
prove nonwillfulness, the IRS charges a high FBAR penalty. However,
in Ms. Olson’s program, if the taxpayer does not fit, the second prong
fails; presumably the taxpayer would simply pay the offshore penalty
under the third prong. Given that for many taxpayers the offshore penalty
is substantially lower than the willful FBAR penalty, this will reduce the
expected liability for most nonwillful taxpayers. The OVDP, however, is
more difficult to administer. Almost every taxpayer would find it
beneficial to argue for nonwillfulness. The only cost for a taxpayer who
chooses to make this argument is additional attorney’s fees.
This paper proposes tweaking Ms. Olson’s program to streamline the
administrative concerns. The first prong, also assessing no liability,
should be modified to include taxpayers who failed to file an FBAR but
123
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have been reporting income, and taxpayers owing a back tax liability of
less than $1,500, before interest and penalties. The de minimus provision
would greatly reduce the administrative burden of the IRS without giving
up substantial revenue. It also might induce more disclosure, which is the
most important goal of the OVDP.
The modified program reserves the second prong for taxpayers taking
the nonwillful penalty. Taxpayers either take the nonwillful penalty
because the IRS could not prove that they acted willfully, or they have an
aggregate balance under $100,000. The IRS would have the right to
bring any taxpayer claiming they belong in the second prong to a tribunal
to prove willfulness. If the IRS proves willfulness, it would subject the
taxpayer to the third prong, and its 27.5% offshore penalty. The
aggregate balance provision is as a de minimus provision, estopping the
IRS from challenging relatively small accounts. When the IRS is
determining the nonwillful penalty, it should assume all individual
accounts were aggregated as one, as not to assess FBAR penalties for
each individual account.
The third prong is for all other taxpayers, presumably those who
clearly acted willfully. The IRS would assess the offshore penalty of
27.5%. Taxpayers choosing the third prong, however, would only be
penalized 20% rather than being rerouted from the second prong. In
short, Ms. Olsen’s modified proposal is:
1. Full Relief from FBAR and Information Reporting Penalties
a. Taxpayers who Failed to File an FBAR but Either
Properly Reported the Income; or
b. Taxpayers who Owe Less than $1,500 of Tax Liability
Before Interest and Penalties
2. Nonwillful Penalty Structure
a. All Taxpayers with an Aggregate Account Balance
Under $100,000; or
b. Taxpayers for whom the IRS Cannot Prove Willfulness
3. Offshore Penalty Structure
a. All Other Taxpayers
This penalty structure addresses the administrative concerns of Ms.
Olson’s proposal. By giving taxpayers a 7.5% penalty reduction for
initially entering the third prong, taxpayers who are clearly willful would
be incentivized to forego the argument. The IRS would also have little
incentive to attempt to prove the willfulness of taxpayers who are clearly
nonwillful. This structure promotes equity while reducing administrative
waste.
Consider how Ms. Bar’s and Mr. Full’s decision changes under this
new Program.
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Table 5. Decision Matrix After New Solution for Ms. Bar and Mr. Full
Avoid the OVDP and
Enter the OVDP
Risk Audit
Expected Penalty of
Expected Penalty of
Ms. Bar
$732,475; Enter
$7,550,400;
(20% Willful;
Compliance; Certainty of
Potential to Avoid
80% Nonwillful)
Penalty Liability
Penalty If Not Audit
Expected Penalty of
$2,489,000 (Accept 20%
Expected Penalty of
Mr. Full
Penalty); Enter
$27,843,750 if Examined;
(70% Willful;
Compliance; Avoid
Potential to Avoid
30% Nonwillful)
Criminal Prosecution;
Penalty If No Audit
Certainty of Penalty
Liability
For Ms. Bar, the expected penalty of avoiding the OVDP remains at
$7,550,400. The expected penalty, however, of entering the OVDP is
reduced to $732,475. For Mr. Full, the expected penalty of avoiding the
OVDP remains at $27,843,750. The expected penalty, however, of
entering the OVDP is $2,489,000; higher than Ms. Bar’s penalty but still
lower than the penalty assessed under the current OVDP.
Under the modified OVDP, Ms. Bar and Mr. Full are incentivized to
disclose. Ms. Bar’s expected tax liability inside the OVDP is over ten
times lower than her expected penalty if caught outside of the Program.
Her expected penalty inside the OVDP falls from $3,422,375 to
$732,475. That provides a remarkably better incentive for her to disclose
under the modified solution. Furthermore, her likelihood of disclosure is
increased by the certainty and utility of compliance. Mr. Full’s expected
tax liability inside the OVDP is more than nine times lower than his
expected penalty if caught outside of the OVDP. His expected penalty
inside the OVDP would fall from $3,422,375 to $2,489,000. This lower
penalty gives him a marginally better reason to disclose under the
modified OVDP. Although it is impossible to say whether either
taxpayer would disclose, the more beneficial penalty framework would
certainly make them more likely to disclose.
The modified OVDP not only improves disclosure incentives, but
increases equity as well. Before this solution, both Mr. Full and Ms. Bar
were best served paying the same offshore penalty under the OVDP.
Given the new structure, Ms. Bar would likely argue that she is
nonwillful, while Mr. Full would likely accept the third prong. Both
taxpayers pay different expected tax liabilities, thus restoring the OVDP
equity concerns caused by Williams.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the popularity and relative success of the OVDP over the last
four years, the IRS cannot afford a decline in its effectiveness. As this
paper explained, the OVDP has been successful according to its goals,

51

WINTER 2014

Effect of United States v. Williams

and has given taxpayers a variety of reasons to disclose. Given the
potentially powerful changes of the Williams case, however, the
continued success of the OVDP is uncertain. Although it seems that there
will still be incentives for taxpayers (especially willful taxpayers) to
enter the OVDP, there are equity problems with the OVDP created by
Williams.
This paper proposes a solution to ensure the OVDP’s success by
preserving administrative resources, and encouraging taxpayers to enter,
while fixing equity concerns. Although this modified OVDP may
sacrifice some revenue, the overall result will be a net gain from
additional disclosure, thus assisting the IRS in future prosecutions.
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